***To answer the question if it can be cracked easily anymore: NO. Hasn't been viable since HaswellxBoot Guard killed the infamous workaround we employed since the 390E; so anything with a 40 designation (e.g. T440, Haswell P series) or newer is a no-go. The motherboard has to be swapped unless you can somehow dump the BIOS; and decrypt it without marring the code such that it changes the private key (verified by Boot Guard) blocks the bootup process and hoping against hope the TPM/security trip doesn't throw the death blow 0192 tamper error (this is nearly unfixable; some old models may be workable but forget about it on the Boot Guard generation due to Intel). They really secured these things down, cryptographically and physically.***
+
***To answer the question if it can be cracked easily anymore: NO. Hasn't been viable since Haswell introduced Boot Guard killed the infamous workaround we employed since the 390E. Any machine with the 40 designation (e.g. T440, Haswell P series) or newer is a no-go; same rule on the consumer machines (Haswell and up=uncrackable). The motherboard has to be swapped unless you can somehow dump the BIOS, decrypt it and remove the BIOS password without marring the code such that it changes the private key (which gets verified by Boot Guard) and blocks the bootup process at the BIOS signature check level. This is in addition to hoping against hope the TPM/security trip doesn't throw the 0192 tamper error (this is nearly unfixable; some old models may be workable but forget about it on the Boot Guard generation due to Intel). They secured these things down, cryptographically and physically.***
-
Lenovos never had a backdoor password but practiced security theater for nearly a decade where if you could find the ATMEL chip and short SCL and SDA together quickly, it bypasses the password so you can remove it but you had to go into the BIOS immediately to wipe all of them out for it to persist. This is because Lenovo stores it in the NVRAM on the new ones, not a dedicated chip. This is in contrast with the old laptops that stored it in the ATMEL chip; this is why anyone with the knowledge can get the job done in minutes. This was in contrast to consumer-grade laptops which used CMOS RAM for decades so it was much easier. You need to reflash these new Lenovos with a clean BIOS (read on for more info) to clean them up.
+
Lenovo never had a backdoor password but has practiced security theater for nearly a decade. If you can find the ATMEL chip and short SCL and SDA together quickly, it bypasses the password so you can remove it. The catch was to remove it for good; you had to go into the BIOS immediately to wipe all of them out for it to persist. Lenovo stores it in the NVRAM on the new ones, not a dedicated chip. This contrasts with the old laptops that stored them in the ATMEL chip; this is why anyone with the knowledge can get the job done in minutes. The only way to remove it on the newer Lenovos is a clean dump of the BIOS and a "blank" TPM/ATMEL chip dump that you have to directly flash to the board with a chip programmer. Lenovo has required this for a long time, even on the consumer side as well, but Haswell and Boot Guard made it significantly more difficult (in contrast, for years on end, removing the battery was enough on consumer-grade laptops).
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On the business models (ThinkPad) with older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); even this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present) with the POP being in the protected NVRAM as well now. It's a motherboard replacement for both the consumer and business system unless you can get Lenovo to reflash both the BIOS and EC firmware (or get a clean dump, do it yourself, and program the information to the motherboard yourself). This is in addition to needing to do an NVRAM wipe if the password and BIOS are stored in separate spaces. Lenovo denies this can be done and makes you buy a motherboard when it can be done by wiping and reflashing the EC firmware/NVRAM and BIOS EEPROM to ensure the job is done. You just have to input the S/N, UUID, and machine type to finish the job. Reflashing both areas is the only way to be ABSOLUTELY SURE the password is gone.
+
On the business models (ThinkPad) with older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); even this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present) with the POP being in the protected NVRAM as well now. It's a motherboard replacement for both the consumer and business system unless you can get Lenovo to reflash the BIOS and EC firmware (or get a clean dump, do it yourself, and program the information to the motherboard yourself). This also needs an NVRAM wipe if the password and BIOS are stored in separate spaces. Lenovo denies this can be done and makes you buy a motherboard when it can be done by wiping and reflashing the EC firmware/NVRAM and BIOS EEPROM to ensure the job is done. You will have to reenter the machine's S/N, UUID, and machine type to finish the job, though. Reflashing both areas is the only way to be SURE the password is gone.
-
Regardless of the type, the newer laptops (Haswell-present) either use Intel Boot Guard or VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the NVRAM or BIOS code if you dump it to attempt to reset it and remove the password or attacks on the ATMEL chip corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new Lenovos (IdeaPad and ThinkPad) are not built around the idea of security theater like the old ones anyone who knows how to locate the ATMEL chip or properly dump and hack the BIOS can fix. We laughed at these old Lenovo laptops and got the job done; now we just don't bother and bin them with the ThinkPad that smoked since they have just as much value.
+
Regardless of the type, the newer laptops (Haswell-present) either use Intel Boot Guard or VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the NVRAM or BIOS code if you dump it to attempt to reset it and remove the password or attacks on the ATMEL chip corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new Lenovos (IdeaPad and ThinkPad) are not built around the idea of security theater like the old ones. Anyone who knows how to locate the ATMEL chip or properly dump and hack the BIOS can fix it. We laughed at these old Lenovo laptops and got the job done; now we don't bother and bin them with the ThinkPad that smoked since they have just as much value.
-
HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines (read: older and exploited, takes a few years to be added to the list of ones which can be cracked) by dumping the BIOS (often requiring a chip desoldering operation due to physical security; some old laptops can be done without it if it has the exposed side pins on the flash ROM), the unlocking tool (easily found online, NOT NAMING NAMES!), and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM (which gets shadow copied to the backup on SureStart laptops to ensure it matches up without the password). Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater (please keep practicing it, Dell. It helps the used market and doesn't turn them into parts machines).
+
HP has had real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines (read: older and exploited, takes a few years to be added to the list of ones which can be cracked) by dumping the BIOS (often requiring a chip desoldering operation due to physical security; some old laptops can be done without it if it has the exposed side pins on the flash ROM), the unlocking tool (easily found online, NOT NAMING NAMES!), and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM (which gets shadow copied to the backup on SureStart laptops to ensure it matches up without the password). Main swapping is impossible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor that practices BIOS security theater (please keep practicing it. It helps the used market and doesn't turn them into parts machines).
***To answer the question if it can be cracked easily anymore: NO. Hasn't been viable since HaswellxBoot Guard killed the infamous workaround we employed since the 390E; so anything with a 40 designation (e.g. T440, Haswell P series) or newer is a no-go. The motherboard has to be swapped unless you can somehow dump the BIOS; and decrypt it without marring the code such that it changes the private key (verified by Boot Guard) blocks the bootup process and hoping against hope the TPM/security trip doesn't throw the death blow 0192 tamper error (this is nearly unfixable; some old models may be workable but forget about it on the Boot Guard generation due to Intel). They really secured these things down, cryptographically and physically.***
-
Lenovos never had a backdoor password but practiced security theater for nearly a decade where if you could find the ATMEL chip and short SCL and SDA together quickly, it bypasses the password so you can remove it but you had to go into the BIOS immediately to wipe all of them out for it to persist. This is because Lenovo stores it in the NVRAM on the new ones; the old laptops store it in the ATMEL chip; hence the hack working. This was in contrast to consumer-grade laptops which used CMOS RAM so it was much easier. You need to reflash these with a clean BIOS (read on for more info) to clean them up.
+
Lenovos never had a backdoor password but practiced security theater for nearly a decade where if you could find the ATMEL chip and short SCL and SDA together quickly, it bypasses the password so you can remove it but you had to go into the BIOS immediately to wipe all of them out for it to persist. This is because Lenovo stores it in the NVRAM on the new ones, not a dedicated chip. This is in contrast with the old laptops that stored it in the ATMEL chip; this is why anyone with the knowledge can get the job done in minutes. This was in contrast to consumer-grade laptops which used CMOS RAM for decades so it was much easier. You need to reflash these new Lenovos with a clean BIOS (read on for more info) to clean them up.
-
On the business models (ThinkPad) with older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); even this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present), with the POP being in the protected NVRAM as well now. It's a motherboard replacement for both the consumer and business system unless you can get Lenovo to reflash both the BIOS and EC firmware (or get a clean dump, do it yourself, and program the information to the motherboard yourself). This is in addition to needing to do an NVRAM wipe if the password and BIOS are stored in separate spaces. Lenovo denies this can be done and makes you buy a motherboard when it can be done by wiping and reflashing the EC firmware/NVRAM and BIOS EEPROM to ensure the job is done and you just input the S/N, UUID, and machine type to finish the job. Reflashing both areas is the only way to be ABSOLUTELY SURE the password is gone.
+
On the business models (ThinkPad) with older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); even this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present) with the POP being in the protected NVRAM as well now. It's a motherboard replacement for both the consumer and business system unless you can get Lenovo to reflash both the BIOS and EC firmware (or get a clean dump, do it yourself, and program the information to the motherboard yourself). This is in addition to needing to do an NVRAM wipe if the password and BIOS are stored in separate spaces. Lenovo denies this can be done and makes you buy a motherboard when it can be done by wiping and reflashing the EC firmware/NVRAM and BIOS EEPROM to ensure the job is done. You just have to input the S/N, UUID, and machine type to finish the job. Reflashing both areas is the only way to be ABSOLUTELY SURE the password is gone.
-
Regardless of the type, the newer laptops (Haswell-present) either use Intel Boot Guard or VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the NVRAM or BIOS code if you dump it to attempt to reset it and remove the password or attacks on the ATMEL chip corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new Lenovos (IdeaPad and ThinkPad) are not built around the idea of security theater like the old ones anyone who knew how to locate the ATMEL chip or properly dump and hack the BIOS can fix now. We laughed at these old Lenovo laptops and got the job done; now we just don't bother; they're dead once this kills it.
+
Regardless of the type, the newer laptops (Haswell-present) either use Intel Boot Guard or VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the NVRAM or BIOS code if you dump it to attempt to reset it and remove the password or attacks on the ATMEL chip corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new Lenovos (IdeaPad and ThinkPad) are not built around the idea of security theater like the old ones anyone who knows how to locate the ATMEL chip or properly dump and hack the BIOS can fix. We laughed at these old Lenovo laptops and got the job done; now we just don't bother and bin them with the ThinkPad that smoked since they have just as much value.
HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines (read: older and exploited, takes a few years to be added to the list of ones which can be cracked) by dumping the BIOS (often requiring a chip desoldering operation due to physical security; some old laptops can be done without it if it has the exposed side pins on the flash ROM), the unlocking tool (easily found online, NOT NAMING NAMES!), and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM (which gets shadow copied to the backup on SureStart laptops to ensure it matches up without the password). Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater (please keep practicing it, Dell. It helps the used market and doesn't turn them into parts machines).
***To answer the question if it can be cracked easily anymore: NO. Hasn't been viable since HaswellxBoot Guard killed the infamous workaround we employed since the 390E; so anything with a 40 designation (e.g. T440, Haswell P series) is a no-go. The motherboard has to be swapped unless you can somehow dump the BIOS; and decrypt it without marring the code such that it changes the private key (verified by Boot Guard) blocks the bootup process and hoping against hope the TPM/security trip doesn't throw the death blow 0192 tamper error (this is nearly unfixable; some old models may be workable but forget about it on the Boot Guard generation due to Intel). They really secured these things down, cryptographically and physically.***
+
***To answer the question if it can be cracked easily anymore: NO. Hasn't been viable since HaswellxBoot Guard killed the infamous workaround we employed since the 390E; so anything with a 40 designation (e.g. T440, Haswell P series) or newer is a no-go. The motherboard has to be swapped unless you can somehow dump the BIOS; and decrypt it without marring the code such that it changes the private key (verified by Boot Guard) blocks the bootup process and hoping against hope the TPM/security trip doesn't throw the death blow 0192 tamper error (this is nearly unfixable; some old models may be workable but forget about it on the Boot Guard generation due to Intel). They really secured these things down, cryptographically and physically.***
Lenovos never had a backdoor password but practiced security theater for nearly a decade where if you could find the ATMEL chip and short SCL and SDA together quickly, it bypasses the password so you can remove it but you had to go into the BIOS immediately to wipe all of them out for it to persist. This is because Lenovo stores it in the NVRAM on the new ones; the old laptops store it in the ATMEL chip; hence the hack working. This was in contrast to consumer-grade laptops which used CMOS RAM so it was much easier. You need to reflash these with a clean BIOS (read on for more info) to clean them up.
On the business models (ThinkPad) with older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); even this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present), with the POP being in the protected NVRAM as well now. It's a motherboard replacement for both the consumer and business system unless you can get Lenovo to reflash both the BIOS and EC firmware (or get a clean dump, do it yourself, and program the information to the motherboard yourself). This is in addition to needing to do an NVRAM wipe if the password and BIOS are stored in separate spaces. Lenovo denies this can be done and makes you buy a motherboard when it can be done by wiping and reflashing the EC firmware/NVRAM and BIOS EEPROM to ensure the job is done and you just input the S/N, UUID, and machine type to finish the job. Reflashing both areas is the only way to be ABSOLUTELY SURE the password is gone.
Regardless of the type, the newer laptops (Haswell-present) either use Intel Boot Guard or VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the NVRAM or BIOS code if you dump it to attempt to reset it and remove the password or attacks on the ATMEL chip corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new Lenovos (IdeaPad and ThinkPad) are not built around the idea of security theater like the old ones anyone who knew how to locate the ATMEL chip or properly dump and hack the BIOS can fix now. We laughed at these old Lenovo laptops and got the job done; now we just don't bother; they're dead once this kills it.
HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines (read: older and exploited, takes a few years to be added to the list of ones which can be cracked) by dumping the BIOS (often requiring a chip desoldering operation due to physical security; some old laptops can be done without it if it has the exposed side pins on the flash ROM), the unlocking tool (easily found online, NOT NAMING NAMES!), and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM (which gets shadow copied to the backup on SureStart laptops to ensure it matches up without the password). Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater (please keep practicing it, Dell. It helps the used market and doesn't turn them into parts machines).
Lenovos never had a backdoor password but practiced security theater for nearly a decade where if you could find the ATMEL chip and short SCL and SDA together quickly, it bypasses the password so you can remove it but you had to go into the BIOS immediately to wipe all of them out for it to persist. This is because Lenovo stores it in the NVRAM on the new ones; the old laptops stored it in the ATMEL chip; hence the hack working. This was in contrast to consumer grade laptops which used CMOS RAM so it was much easier. You need to reflash these with a clean BIOS (read on for more info) to clean them up.
+
***To answer the question if it can be cracked easily anymore: NO. Hasn't been viable since HaswellxBoot Guard killed the infamous workaround we employed since the 390E; so anything with a 40 designation (e.g. T440, Haswell P series) is a no-go. The motherboard has to be swapped unless you can somehow dump the BIOS; and decrypt it without marring the code such that it changes the private key (verified by Boot Guard) blocks the bootup process and hoping against hope the TPM/security trip doesn't throw the death blow 0192 tamper error (this is nearly unfixable; some old models may be workable but forget about it on the Boot Guard generation due to Intel). They really secured these things down, cryptographically and physically.***
+
+
Lenovos never had a backdoor password but practiced security theater for nearly a decade where if you could find the ATMEL chip and short SCL and SDA together quickly, it bypasses the password so you can remove it but you had to go into the BIOS immediately to wipe all of them out for it to persist. This is because Lenovo stores it in the NVRAM on the new ones; the old laptops store it in the ATMEL chip; hence the hack working. This was in contrast to consumer-grade laptops which used CMOS RAM so it was much easier. You need to reflash these with a clean BIOS (read on for more info) to clean them up.
On the business models (ThinkPad) with older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); even this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present), with the POP being in the protected NVRAM as well now. It's a motherboard replacement for both the consumer and business system unless you can get Lenovo to reflash both the BIOS and EC firmware (or get a clean dump, do it yourself, and program the information to the motherboard yourself). This is in addition to needing to do an NVRAM wipe if the password and BIOS are stored in separate spaces. Lenovo denies this can be done and makes you buy a motherboard when it can be done by wiping and reflashing the EC firmware/NVRAM and BIOS EEPROM to ensure the job is done and you just input the S/N, UUID, and machine type to finish the job. Reflashing both areas is the only way to be ABSOLUTELY SURE the password is gone.
Regardless of the type, the newer laptops (Haswell-present) either use Intel Boot Guard or VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the NVRAM or BIOS code if you dump it to attempt to reset it and remove the password or attacks on the ATMEL chip corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new Lenovos (IdeaPad and ThinkPad) are not built around the idea of security theater like the old ones anyone who knew how to locate the ATMEL chip or properly dump and hack the BIOS can fix now. We laughed at these old Lenovo laptops and got the job done; now we just don't bother; they're dead once this kills it.
HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines (read: older and exploited, takes a few years to be added to the list of ones which can be cracked) by dumping the BIOS (often requiring a chip desoldering operation due to physical security; some old laptops can be done without it if it has the exposed side pins on the flash ROM), the unlocking tool (easily found online, NOT NAMING NAMES!), and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM (which gets shadow copied to the backup on SureStart laptops to ensure it matches up without the password). Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater (please keep practicing it, Dell. It helps the used market and doesn't turn them into parts machines).
Lenovos never had a backdoor password but practiced security theater for nearly a decade where if you could find the ATMEL chip and short SCL and SDA together quickly, it bypasses the password so you can remove it but you had to go into the BIOS immediately to wipe all of them out for it to persist. This is because Lenovo stores it in the NVRAM on the new ones; the old laptops stored it in the ATMEL chip; hence the hack working. This was in contrast to consumer grade laptops which used CMOS RAM so it was much easier. You need to reflash these with a clean BIOS (read on for more info) to clean them up.
On the business models (ThinkPad) with older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); even this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present), with the POP being in the protected NVRAM as well now. It's a motherboard replacement for both the consumer and business system unless you can get Lenovo to reflash both the BIOS and EC firmware (or get a clean dump, do it yourself, and program the information to the motherboard yourself). This is in addition to needing to do an NVRAM wipe if the password and BIOS are stored in separate spaces. Lenovo denies this can be done and makes you buy a motherboard when it can be done by wiping and reflashing the EC firmware/NVRAM and BIOS EEPROM to ensure the job is done and you just input the S/N, UUID, and machine type to finish the job. Reflashing both areas is the only way to be ABSOLUTELY SURE the password is gone.
Regardless of the type, the newer laptops (Haswell-present) either use Intel Boot Guard or VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the NVRAM or BIOS code if you dump it to attempt to reset it and remove the password or attacks on the ATMEL chip corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new Lenovos (IdeaPad and ThinkPad) are not built around the idea of security theater like the old ones anyone who knew how to locate the ATMEL chip or properly dump and hack the BIOS can fix now. We laughed at these old Lenovo laptops and got the job done; now we just don't bother; they're dead once this kills it.
-
HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines (read: older and exploited, takes a few years to be added to the list of ones which can be cracked) by dumping the BIOS (often requiring a chip desoldering operation due to physical security; some old laptops can be done without it if it has the exposed side pins on the flash ROM), the unlocking tool (easily found online, NOT NAMING NAMES!), and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM (which gets shadow copied to the backup on SureStart laptops). Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater (please keep practicing it, Dell. It helps the used market and doesn't turn them into parts machines).
+
HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines (read: older and exploited, takes a few years to be added to the list of ones which can be cracked) by dumping the BIOS (often requiring a chip desoldering operation due to physical security; some old laptops can be done without it if it has the exposed side pins on the flash ROM), the unlocking tool (easily found online, NOT NAMING NAMES!), and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM (which gets shadow copied to the backup on SureStart laptops to ensure it matches up without the password). Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater (please keep practicing it, Dell. It helps the used market and doesn't turn them into parts machines).
Lenovos never had a backdoor password but practiced security theater for nearly a decade where if you could find the ATMEL chip and short SCL and SDA together quickly, it bypasses the password so you can remove it but you had to go into the BIOS immediately to wipe all of them out for it to persist. This is because Lenovo stores it in the NVRAM on the new ones; the old laptops stored it in the ATMEL chip; hence the hack working. This was in contrast to consumer grade laptops which used CMOS RAM so it was much easier. You need to reflash these with a clean BIOS (read on for more info) to clean them up.
On the business models (ThinkPad) with older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); even this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present), with the POP being in the protected NVRAM as well now. It's a motherboard replacement for both the consumer and business system unless you can get Lenovo to reflash both the BIOS and EC firmware (or get a clean dump, do it yourself, and program the information to the motherboard yourself). This is in addition to needing to do an NVRAM wipe if the password and BIOS are stored in separate spaces. Lenovo denies this can be done and makes you buy a motherboard when it can be done by wiping and reflashing the EC firmware/NVRAM and BIOS EEPROM to ensure the job is done and you just input the S/N, UUID, and machine type to finish the job. Reflashing both areas is the only way to be ABSOLUTELY SURE the password is gone.
Regardless of the type, the newer laptops (Haswell-present) either use Intel Boot Guard or VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the NVRAM or BIOS code if you dump it to attempt to reset it and remove the password or attacks on the ATMEL chip corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new Lenovos (IdeaPad and ThinkPad) are not built around the idea of security theater like the old ones anyone who knew how to locate the ATMEL chip or properly dump and hack the BIOS can fix now. We laughed at these old Lenovo laptops and got the job done; now we just don't bother; they're dead once this kills it.
-
HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines (read: older and exploited, takes a few years to be added to the list of ones which can be cracked) by dumping the BIOS (often requiring a chip desoldering operation due to physical security; some old laptops can be done without it if it has the exposed side pins on the flash ROM), the unlocking tool (easily found online, NOT NAMING NAMES!), and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM (which will get shadow copied to the backup on SureStart laptops). Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater (please keep practicing it, Dell. It helps the used market and doesn't turn them into parts machines).
+
HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines (read: older and exploited, takes a few years to be added to the list of ones which can be cracked) by dumping the BIOS (often requiring a chip desoldering operation due to physical security; some old laptops can be done without it if it has the exposed side pins on the flash ROM), the unlocking tool (easily found online, NOT NAMING NAMES!), and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM (which gets shadow copied to the backup on SureStart laptops). Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater (please keep practicing it, Dell. It helps the used market and doesn't turn them into parts machines).
Lenovos do not have a backdoor password, and the password is stored in NVRAM, not the CMOS RAM as a lot of laptops on the consumer side did for years. You need to reflash these with a clean BIOS (read on for more info) to clean them up.
+
Lenovos never had a backdoor password but practiced security theater for nearly a decade where if you could find the ATMEL chip and short SCL and SDA together quickly, it bypasses the password so you can remove it but you had to go into the BIOS immediately to wipe all of them out for it to persist. This is because Lenovo stores it in the NVRAM on the new ones; the old laptops stored it in the ATMEL chip; hence the hack working. This was in contrast to consumer grade laptops which used CMOS RAM so it was much easier. You need to reflash these with a clean BIOS (read on for more info) to clean them up.
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On the business models (ThinkPad) with older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); even this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present), with the POP being in the protected NVRAM as well now. It's a motherboard replacement for both the consumer and business system unless you can get Lenovo to reflash both the BIOS and EC firmware, as well as reset the encrypted password data if it's separate (yep, both need to be reflashed) for a fee or get the reference Lenovo BIOS and EC firmware (aswell as your S/N, UUID if needed, and machine type), dump the locked BIOS and EC firmware as a backup AND THEN flash the clean BIOS and EC firmware,then in reprogram those 3 critical pieces of data.
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On the business models (ThinkPad) with older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); even this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present), with the POP being in the protected NVRAM as well now. It's a motherboard replacement for both the consumer and business system unless you can get Lenovo to reflash both the BIOS and EC firmware (or get a clean dump, do it yourself, and program the information to the motherboard yourself). This is in addition to needing to do an NVRAM wipe if the password and BIOS are stored in separate spaces. Lenovo denies this can be done and makes you buy a motherboard when it can be done by wiping and reflashing the EC firmware/NVRAM and BIOS EEPROM to ensure the job is done and you just input the S/N, UUID, and machine type to finish the job. Reflashing both areas is the only way to be ABSOLUTELY SURE the password is gone.
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Regardless of the type, the newer laptops (Haswell-present) either use Intel Boot Guard or VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the NVRAM or BIOS code if you dump it to attempt to reset it and remove the password or attacks on the ATMEL chip corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new Lenovos (IdeaPad and ThinkPad) are not built around the idea of security theater like the old ones anyone who knew how to locate the ATMEL chip or properly dump and hack the BIOS can fix now.[br]
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HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines (read: older and exploited, takes a few years to be added to the list of ones which can be cracked) by dumping the BIOS (chip desoldering often needed with HP as they use a BGA part in newer models because it's physically more secure unless you can get enough of a bite with a clip which can read it), the unlocking tool (easily found online, NOT NAMING NAMES!), and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM (which will get shadow copied to the backup). Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater (please keep practicing it, Dell. It helps the used market and doesn't turn them into parts machines).
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Regardless of the type, the newer laptops (Haswell-present) either use Intel Boot Guard or VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the NVRAM or BIOS code if you dump it to attempt to reset it and remove the password or attacks on the ATMEL chip corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new Lenovos (IdeaPad and ThinkPad) are not built around the idea of security theater like the old ones anyone who knew how to locate the ATMEL chip or properly dump and hack the BIOS can fix now. We laughed at these old Lenovo laptops and got the job done; now we just don't bother; they're dead once this kills it.
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HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines (read: older and exploited, takes a few years to be added to the list of ones which can be cracked) by dumping the BIOS (often requiring a chip desoldering operation due to physical security; some old laptops can be done without it if it has the exposed side pins on the flash ROM), the unlocking tool (easily found online, NOT NAMING NAMES!), and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM (which will get shadow copied to the backup on SureStart laptops). Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater (please keep practicing it, Dell. It helps the used market and doesn't turn them into parts machines).
Lenovos do not have a backdoor password, and the password is stored in NVRAM, not the CMOS RAM as a lot of laptops on the consumer side did for years. You need to reflash these with a clean BIOS (read on for more info) to clean them up.
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On the business models (ThinkPad) with older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); even this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present), with the POP being in the protected NVRAM as well now. It's a motherboard replacement for both the consumer and business system unless you can get Lenovo to reflash both the BIOS and EC firmware, as well as reset the encrypted password data if it's separate (yep, both need to be reflashed) for a fee or get the reference Lenovo BIOS and EC firmware (as well as your S/N, UUID if needed, and machine type), dump the locked as a backup AND THEN flash the reference BIOS in addition to reprogramming those 3 critical pieces of data.
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On the business models (ThinkPad) with older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); even this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present), with the POP being in the protected NVRAM as well now. It's a motherboard replacement for both the consumer and business system unless you can get Lenovo to reflash both the BIOS and EC firmware, as well as reset the encrypted password data if it's separate (yep, both need to be reflashed) for a fee or get the reference Lenovo BIOS and EC firmware (as well as your S/N, UUID if needed, and machine type), dump the locked BIOS and EC firmware as a backup AND THEN flash the clean BIOS and EC firmware, then in reprogram those 3 critical pieces of data.
Regardless of the type, the newer laptops (Haswell-present) either use Intel Boot Guard or VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the NVRAM or BIOS code if you dump it to attempt to reset it and remove the password or attacks on the ATMEL chip corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new Lenovos (IdeaPad and ThinkPad) are not built around the idea of security theater like the old ones anyone who knew how to locate the ATMEL chip or properly dump and hack the BIOS can fix now.[br]
HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines (read: older and exploited, takes a few years to be added to the list of ones which can be cracked) by dumping the BIOS (chip desoldering often needed with HP as they use a BGA part in newer models because it's physically more secure unless you can get enough of a bite with a clip which can read it), the unlocking tool (easily found online, NOT NAMING NAMES!), and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM (which will get shadow copied to the backup). Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater (please keep practicing it, Dell. It helps the used market and doesn't turn them into parts machines).
Lenovos do not have a backdoor password, and the password is stored in NVRAM, not the CMOS RAM as a lot of laptops on the consumer side did for years. You need to reflash these with a clean BIOS (read on for more info) to clean them up.
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On the business models (ThinkPad) with older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); even this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present), with the POP being in the protected NVRAM as well now. It's a motherboard replacement for both the consumer and business system unless you can get Lenovo to reflash it for a fee or get the reference Lenovo BIOS files (as well as your S/N, UUID if needed, and machine type), dump the locked as a backup AND THEN flash the reference BIOS in addition to reprogramming those 3 critical pieces of data.
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On the business models (ThinkPad) with older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); even this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present), with the POP being in the protected NVRAM as well now. It's a motherboard replacement for both the consumer and business system unless you can get Lenovo to reflash both the BIOS and EC firmware, as well as reset the encrypted password data if it's separate (yep, both need to be reflashed) for a fee or get the reference Lenovo BIOS and EC firmware (as well as your S/N, UUID if needed, and machine type), dump the locked as a backup AND THEN flash the reference BIOS in addition to reprogramming those 3 critical pieces of data.
Regardless of the type, the newer laptops (Haswell-present) either use Intel Boot Guard or VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the NVRAM or BIOS code if you dump it to attempt to reset it and remove the password or attacks on the ATMEL chip corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new Lenovos (IdeaPad and ThinkPad) are not built around the idea of security theater like the old ones anyone who knew how to locate the ATMEL chip or properly dump and hack the BIOS can fix now.[br]
HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines (read: older and exploited, takes a few years to be added to the list of ones which can be cracked) by dumping the BIOS (chip desoldering often needed with HP as they use a BGA part in newer models because it's physically more secure unless you can get enough of a bite with a clip which can read it), the unlocking tool (easily found online, NOT NAMING NAMES!), and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM (which will get shadow copied to the backup). Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater (please keep practicing it, Dell. It helps the used market and doesn't turn them into parts machines).
Lenovos do not have a backdoor password, and the password is stored in NVRAM. On the older models like the XX30,the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present). Even the POP is protected in NVRAM now, not just the SVP; the POP used to be in CMOS RAM. It's a motherboard replacement unless you can get Lenovo to reflash it or get the reference Lenovo BIOS files, dump the locked as a backup, put that image on the laptop,then program the S/N and machine type, as well as the UUID.
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Lenovos do not have a backdoor password, and the password is stored in NVRAM, not the CMOS RAM as a lot of laptops on the consumer side did for years. You need to reflash these with a clean BIOS (read on for more info) to clean them up.
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The newer ones use Intel Boot Guard and on the AMD models VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the ATMEL chip or NVRAM corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new ThinkPads are not built around the idea of security theater like the old ones anyone who knew how to locate the chip and lines could fix.[br]
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HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines by dumping the BIOS (chip desoldering or a reader needed), unlocking it with a tool easily found online, and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM. Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater (please keep practicing it, Dell. It helps the used market and doesn't turn them into parts machines).
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On the business models (ThinkPad) with older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); even this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present), with the POP being in the protected NVRAM as well now. It's a motherboard replacement for both the consumer and business system unless you can get Lenovo to reflash it for a fee or get the reference Lenovo BIOS files (as well as your S/N, UUID if needed, and machine type), dump the locked as a backup AND THEN flash the reference BIOS in addition to reprogramming those 3 critical pieces of data.
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Regardless of the type, the newer laptops (Haswell-present) either use Intel Boot Guard or VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the NVRAM or BIOS code if you dump it to attempt to reset it and remove the password or attacks on the ATMEL chip corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new Lenovos (IdeaPad and ThinkPad) are not built around the idea of security theater like the old ones anyone who knew how to locate the ATMEL chip or properly dump and hack the BIOS can fix now.[br]
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HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines (read: older and exploited, takes a few years to be added to the list of ones which can be cracked) by dumping the BIOS (chip desoldering often needed with HP as they use a BGA part in newer models because it's physically more secure unless you can get enough of a bite with a clip which can read it), the unlocking tool (easily found online, NOT NAMING NAMES!), and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM (which will get shadow copied to the backup). Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater (please keep practicing it, Dell. It helps the used market and doesn't turn them into parts machines).
Lenovos do not have a backdoor password, and the password is stored in NVRAM. On the older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present). Even the POP is protected in NVRAM now, not just the SVP; the POP used to be in CMOS RAM. It's a motherboard replacement unless you can get Lenovo to reflash it or get the reference Lenovo BIOS files, dump the locked as a backup, put that image on the laptop, then program the S/N and machine type, as well as the UUID.
The newer ones use Intel Boot Guard and on the AMD models VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the ATMEL chip or NVRAM corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new ThinkPads are not built around the idea of security theater like the old ones anyone who knew how to locate the chip and lines could fix.[br]
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HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines by dumping the BIOS (chip desoldering or a reader needed), unlocking it with a tool easily found online, and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM. Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater.
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HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines by dumping the BIOS (chip desoldering or a reader needed), unlocking it with a tool easily found online, and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM. Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater (please keep practicing it, Dell. It helps the used market and doesn't turn them into parts machines).
Lenovos do not have a backdoor password, and the password is stored in NVRAM. On the older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present). Even the POP is protected in NVRAM now, not just the SVP; the POP used to be in CMOS RAM.
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Lenovos do not have a backdoor password, and the password is stored in NVRAM. On the older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present). Even the POP is protected in NVRAM now, not just the SVP; the POP used to be in CMOS RAM. It's a motherboard replacement unless you can get Lenovo to reflash it or get the reference Lenovo BIOS files, dump the locked as a backup, put that image on the laptop, then program the S/N and machine type, as well as the UUID.
The newer ones use Intel Boot Guard and on the AMD models VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the ATMEL chip or NVRAM corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new ThinkPads are not built around the idea of security theater like the old ones anyone who knew how to locate the chip and lines could fix.[br]
HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines by dumping the BIOS (chip desoldering or a reader needed), unlocking it with a tool easily found online, and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM. Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater.
Lenovos do not have a backdoor password, and the password is stored in NVRAM. On the older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present). Even the POP is protected in NVRAM now, not just the SVP; the POP used to be in CMOS RAM.
The newer ones use Intel Boot Guard and on the AMD models VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the ATMEL chip or NVRAM corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new ThinkPads are not built around the idea of security theater like the old ones anyone who knew how to locate the chip and lines could fix.[br]
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HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines by dumping the BIOS (chip desoldering or a reader needed), unlocking it with a tool easily found online, and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the board. Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater.
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HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines by dumping the BIOS (chip desoldering or a reader needed), unlocking it with a tool easily found online, and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the main EEPROM. Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater.
Lenovos do not have a backdoor password, and the password is stored in NVRAM. On the older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present). Even the POP is protected in NVRAM now, not just the SVP; the POP used to be in CMOS RAM.
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The newer ones use Intel Boot Guard and on the AMD models VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the ATMEL chip or NVRAM corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new ThinkPads are not built around troll toll security theater like the old ones anyone who knew how to locate the chip and lines could fix.[br]
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HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done by dumping, unlocking, and reflashing the original BIOS to the board as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board). Dell is the only "security theater" vendor left.
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The newer ones use Intel Boot Guard and on the AMD models VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the ATMEL chip or NVRAM corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new ThinkPads are not built around the idea of security theater like the old ones anyone who knew how to locate the chip and lines could fix.[br]
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HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done on the right machines by dumping the BIOS (chip desoldering or a reader needed), unlocking it with a tool easily found online, and reflashing the original "unlocked" BIOS to the board. Main swapping is not possible as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board unless it has LD but a "clean BIOS"). Dell is the only vendor left who practices BIOS security theater.
Lenovos do not have a backdoor password, and the password is stored in NVRAM. On the older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present). Even the POP is protected in NVRAM now, not just the SVP; the POP used to be in CMOS RAM.
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The newer ones use Intel Boot Guard and on the AMD models VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the ATMEL chip or NVRAM corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new ThinkPads are not security theater like the old ones.[br]
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The newer ones use Intel Boot Guard and on the AMD models VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the ATMEL chip or NVRAM corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new ThinkPads are not built around troll toll security theater like the old ones anyone who knew how to locate the chip and lines could fix.[br]
HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done by dumping, unlocking, and reflashing the original BIOS to the board as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board). Dell is the only "security theater" vendor left.
Lenovos do not have a backdoor password, and the password is stored in NVRAM. On the older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present). Even the POP is protected in NVRAM now, not just the SVP; the POP used to be in CMOS RAM.
The newer ones use Intel Boot Guard and on the AMD models VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the ATMEL chip or NVRAM corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new ThinkPads are not security theater like the old ones.[br]
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HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done by dumping, unlocking, and reflashing the original BIOS to the board as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point. Why? Swap the board). Dell is the only "security theater" vendor left.
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HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done by dumping, unlocking, and reflashing the original BIOS to the board as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point.... swap the board). Dell is the only "security theater" vendor left.
Lenovos do not have a backdoor password, and the password is stored in NVRAM. On the older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present).
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Lenovos do not have a backdoor password, and the password is stored in NVRAM. On the older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present). Even the POP is protected in NVRAM now, not just the SVP; the POP used to be in CMOS RAM.
The newer ones use Intel Boot Guard and on the AMD models VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the ATMEL chip or NVRAM corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new ThinkPads are not security theater like the old ones.[br]
HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done by dumping, unlocking, and reflashing the original BIOS to the board as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point. Why? Swap the board). Dell is the only "security theater" vendor left.
Lenovos do not have a backdoor password, and the password is stored in NVRAM. On the older models like the XX30, the solution was to find the ATMEL chip and short 2 lines, or use an HW tool to do it (sold by an Australian); this no longer works on the newer Think laptops (XX40-present).
The newer ones use Intel Boot Guard and on the AMD models VERY ROBUST signature checks, which means any attack on the ATMEL chip or NVRAM corrupts it and kills the boot process until the "correct" BIOS image is in place which will make the password issue come back :(. These new ThinkPads are not security theater like the old ones.[br]
HP has some real security in place since the process can only be done by dumping, unlocking, and reflashing the original BIOS to the board as you CANNOT MIX THE MAIN AND BACKUP BIOS on those laptops unless you have both ROMs from a clean board (at which point. Why? Swap the board). Dell is the only "security theater" vendor left.